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We develop a simple model of the foreign exchange market in which agents 
optimize their portfolio and use different forecasting rules. They check the 
profitability of these rules ex post and select the more profitable one.This model 
produces two kinds of equilibria, a fundamental and a bubble one. In a stochastic 
environment the model generates a complex dynamics in which bubbles and 
crashes occur at unpredictable moments. We also analyse the empirical relevance 
of the model. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Since the publication of Kindleberger’s ”Manias, Panics, and Crashes” in 1978,
a large literature has ﬂourished on the theory and the empirics of bubbles and
crashes in ﬁnancial markets. Two schools of thought can be detected. One
school has developed from the contributions of Blanchard in the late ’70s on
rational bubbles (see Blanchard(1979), Blanchard and Watson(1982)). In this
view, bubbles can occur in rational expectations (RE) models when the time of
the crash is not known with certainty. It is then in the interest of rational agents
to ”ride the bubble”1. A second school of thought has concentrated on the non
rational sources of the emergence of bubbles (herding behaviour, bandwagon
eﬀects2).
Both approaches suﬀer from some inherent defects. The rational expecta-
tions approach has come under increasing criticism both from a theoretical and
empirical point of view. The main criticism is that it assumes that individual
agents are capable of storing and processing in their individual brains all the rel-
evant information existing in the outside world; an information set which in its
complexity by far surpasses the complexity of the individual brain. The response
to this criticism has usually been that the rational expectations assumptions is
nothing but an assumption about the model-consistency of expectations. The
price for this requirement of logical consistency, however, is that in order to
make it plausible that agents operating in such a model can be assumed to
understand its structure, rational expectations models have to be kept exceed-
ingly simple. As a result, the informational problems agents face in a complex
environment is assumed away3. All this would not really be a problem if the
rational expectations models would pass the only important scientiﬁct e s tw h i c h
is its empirical veriﬁcation. Unfortunately, the accumulated empirical evidence
in the ﬁnancial markets is not favourable for the rational expectations model.
Too many anomalies have been detected in the ﬁnancial markets contradicting
the rational expectations paradigm. (See De Grauwe and Grimaldi(2003) for a
discussion of these anomalies in the foreign exchange market).
Apart from this general criticism of the rational expectations model, the
Blanchard-Watson rational bubble model can be criticised for the fact that it
predicts the occurrence of bubbles whose features are not found in empirical
evidence (e.g. exponentially distributed bubbles, symmetry between bubble
and crash phases, see Mandelbrot(1997) and Lux and Sornette (2002)).
1There is of course a strong ”negationist” tradition in the ratioanl expectations literature
which denies the existence of bubbles and crashes. In a rational expectations eﬃcient market
world bubbles and crashes are meaningless concepts, since the exchange rate always reﬂects the
changing and often volatile information on underlying fundamental variables. A well-known
proponent of this view is Garber(2000).
2For a recent insightful analysis see Shiller(2000). There is also a strong tradition in the
behavioural ﬁnance literature analysing anomalies in the ﬁnancial markets that can trigger
bubbles and crashes. See Schleiﬀer(2000) and Thaler(1994).
3A recent booming literature tries to deal with this problem by introducing adaptive learn-
ing. This literature has led to important new insights. For interesting contributions introduc-
ing least squares learning see Evans and Honkapohja(2001).
2The second approach, focusing on the irrationality of agents, provides a
wealth of insights in the complexity of human behaviour. The problem it faces,
however, is that it has to make as many special assumptions about human
behaviour as the number of phenomena it wishes to explain. As a result, it has
not yet developed into a scientiﬁc alternative for explaining bubbles and crashes
in the ﬁnancial markets.
The aim of this paper is to suggest a possible third alternative for under-
standing why bubbles and crashes occur in the foreign exchange markets. We
develop a simple model of the exchange rate in which we relax the RE hyphote-
sis. We assume that individual agents are not capable of using all available
information in the model, and that they select diﬀerent simple forecasting rules.
Although agents have potentially access to the same kind of information they
diﬀer in the interpretation and in the use of such information4.
We assume two kinds of agents, fundamentalists who use fundamental in-
formation and technical traders (chartists) who extrapolate past exchange rate
changes. Empirical evidence that supports the proﬁtability of technical trading
rules is provided, among others, by Taylor and Allen(1992) and LeBaron(1999).
Both the fundamentalists and the chartists evaluate the ﬁtness of their respec-
tive forecasting rules based on the risk adjusted proﬁts and they decide to switch
to the most proﬁtable one. Thus, agents are not irrational in our model. They
know that they cannot comprehend the full complexity of the underlying model.
As a result, the rational response is to try diﬀerent forecasting rules and to select
the one that performs best.
We show that bubbles and crashes occur as a result of the interaction between
agents using diﬀerent forecasting rules. We analyse under which conditions bub-
bles occur and we study the nature of these bubbles. Next we check if our model
reproduces the statistical properties of the exchange rate movements. We argue
that our model is capable of explaining the ’anomalies’ that have been detected
by the empirical evidence which could not be explained by the traditional mod-
els. In particular most of the empirical ﬁndings document that the exchange
rate returns have excess kurtosis and fat tails (see de Vries(2001), Lux T. (1997,
1998), Lux and Marchesi (1999, 2000). This evidence is diﬃcult to rationalise in
rational expectations eﬃcient market exchange rate models, since there is little
evidence of fat tails in the fundamental variables that drive the exchange rate
in these models. Other empirical anomalies have been uncovered over the years.
One is the “excess volatility” puzzle of the exchange rate, i.e. the volatility
of the exchange rate by far exceeds the volatility of the underlying economic
variables (Baxter and Stockman (1989) and Flood and Rose (1995)). We show
that this puzzle can easily be rationalized in our model. Finally we compute
the proﬁts and losses that chartists and fundamentalists make depending on the
accuracy of their respective forecasting rules.
4T h ef a c tt h a ta g e n t si n t e r p r e ti nad i ﬀerent way the same information has been conﬁrmed
empirically by Kandel and Pearson(1995).
32 The model
I nt h i ss e c t i o nw ed e v e l o pas i m p l em o d e lo ft h ee x c h a n g er a t e. T h em o d e l
consists of three building blocks. First, agents select their optimal portfolio
using a mean-variance utility framework. Second, they make forecasts about the
future exchange rate based on simple but diﬀerent rules. Third, they evaluate
these rules ex-post by comparing their risk-adjusted proﬁtability.
2.1 The optimal portfolio
We assume agents of diﬀerent types i depending on their beliefs about the future
exchange rate. Each agent can invest in two assets, a domestic and a foreign









t+1 is the wealth of agent of type i at time t+1, Et.is the expecta-
tion operator, µ is the coeﬃcient of risk aversion and V i(Wi
t+1) represents the










where r and r∗ are respectively the domestic and the foreign interest rates, st+1
i st h ee x c h a n g er a t ea tt i m et + 1 ,di,t represents the holdings of the foreign
assets by agent of type i at time t. Thus, the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side
of 2 represents the value of the foreign portfolio in domestic currency at time
t+1 while the second term represents the value of the domestic portfolio at time
t+1.
Substituiting equation 2 in 1 and maximising the utility with respect to di,t








The optimal holding of the foreign asset depends on the expected excess return
corrected for risk. The market demand for foreign assets at time t is the sum of
the individual demands, i.e.:
N X
i=1
ni,tdi,t = Dt (4)
where ni,t i st h en u m b e ro fa g e n t so ft y p ei .
Market equilibrium implies that the market demand is equal to the market
supply Xt w h i c hw ea s s u m et ob ee x o g e n o u s 5.T h u s ,
5The market supply is determined by the net current account and by the sales or purchases
of foreign exchange of the central bank. We assume both to be exogenous. In an extension of
this paper we intend to endogenise the market supply.
4Xt = Dt (5)
Substituting the optimal holdings into the market demand and then into the


























where wi,t = ni,t\N,.i.e. the weight (share) of agent i. In order to model the
expectations formation we assume that there are two types of agents: chartists
































Thus the exchange rate is determined by the expectations of fundamentalists,
E
f
t ,a n dc h a r t i s t sEc
t about the future exchange rate. These forecasts are
weighted by their respective variances σ2
f,t and σ2
c,t. Thus, when for example
the chartists’ forecasts have a high variance the weight of the chartists in the
determination of the market exchange rate is reduced.
2.2 The forecasting rules
We now specify how fundamentalists and chartists.form their expectations of
the future exchange rate. In a second step we will specify how they take into
account the risk as measured by the variances.
The fundamentalists base their forecast on a comparison between the mar-
ket and the fundamental exchange rate, i.e. they forecast the market rate to
return to the fundamental rate in the future. In this sense they use a negative
feedback rule that introduces a mean reverting dynamics in the exchange rate.
The speed with which the market exchange rate returns to the fundamental
i sa s s u m e dt ob ed e t e r m i n e db yt h es p e e do fa d j u s t m e n ti nt h eg o o d sm a r k e t
which is assumed to be in the information set of the fundamentalists (together




t (∆st+1)=−ψ (st − s∗
t) (8)
where s∗
t is the fundamental exchange rate at time t , which is assumed to follow
a random walk and 0 < ψ < ∞.
T h ec h a r t i s t sf o r e c a s tt h ef u t u r ee x c h a n g er a t eb ye x t r a p o l a t i n gp a s te x -






Thus, the chartists compute a moving average of the past exchange rate changes
and they extrapolate this into the future exchange rate change. The degree of
extrapolation is given by the parameter β. Note that in contrast to the funda-
mentalists, chartists take into account information concerning the fundamental
exchange rate indirectly, i.e. through the exchange rate itself. However, they
also take into account other bits of information which are reﬂected in the ex-
change rate. In particular they take into account the "market sentiments".
They buy and sell according to trends that they detect in the market. In this
sense the chartist rule can also be seen as reﬂecting herding behaviour.
Our choice to give a prominent role to chartists’ rules of forecasting is based
on empirical evidence. The evidence that chartism is used widely to make fore-
casts is overwhelming (see Cheung and Chinn(1989), Taylor and Allen(1992)).
It remains important, however, to check if the model is internally consistent. In
particular, the chartists’ forecasting rule must be shown to be proﬁtable within
the conﬁnes of the model. If these rules turn out to be unproﬁtable, they will
n o tc o n t i n u et ob eu s e d . W er e t u r nt ot h i si s s u ew h e nw el e tt h en u m b e ro f
chartists be determined by the proﬁtability of the chartists’ forecasting rule.
We now analyse how fundamentalists and chartists evaluate the risk involved
in forecasting. The latter is measured by the variance terms in equation 7, which
we deﬁne as the weighted average of the squared (one period ahead) forecasting







t−k (st−k+1) − st−k+1
¤2
(10)
where γk are geometrically declining weights.
2.3 Fitness of the rules
The next step in our analysis is to specify how agents evaluate the ﬁtness of
these two forecasting rules. The general idea that we will follow is that agents
use one of the two rules, compare their (risk adjusted) proﬁtability ex post and
then decide whether to keep the rule or switch to the other one. Thus, our
model is in the logic of evolutionary dynamics, in which simple decision rules
are followed. These rules will continue to be followed if they pass some ”ﬁtness”
test (proﬁtability test). Another way to interpret this is as follows. When great
uncertainty exists about how the complex world functions, agents use a trial
and error strategy. They try a particular forecasting rule until they ﬁnd out
that other rules work better. Such a trial and error strategy can be considered
to be a rational strategy when agents cannot understand the full complexity of
the underlying model. It can even be argued that it is a more rational strategy
than the strategy followed by agents in rational expectations models, where
6these agents have the ambition to understand the underlying model in all its
complexity.
We start by specifying the dynamics that governs the number of chartists
and fundamentalists, namely nct and nft. In order to do so, we describe how
the number of chartists and fundamentalists changes from period t-1 to period
t:










where nc,t and nf,t are the number of chartists and fundamentalists in period
t6; p
cf
t represents the fraction of the chartists who decide to become fundamen-
talists in period t, and p
fc
t is the fraction of the fundamentalists who decide to
become chartists in period t.
These fractions are assumed to be a function of the proﬁtability of the fore-








































f,t−1 are the risk adjusted net proﬁts made by chartists’




f,t−1 = πf,t−1 −C −µσ2
f,t−1. We assume that the funda-
mentalists make a ﬁxed cost C for the collection and processing of fundamental
information, while the collection of information by chartists is assumed to be
costless8.
Equations 13and 14 can be interpreted as follows. When the risk adjusted
proﬁts of the chartists’ rule increases relative to the risk adjusted net proﬁts of
the fundamentalists rule, then the fraction of the fundamentalists who become
chartists in period t increases, and vice versa. The parameter which regulates
such switches is γ.This parameter can be interpreted as the rate with which the
6It should be noted that our modelling approach shares important features with the multi-
agent based models in which market partecipants evolve over time. However, in contrast with
such models the characteristics of our model are independent of the total number of agents in
the market.
7This speciﬁcation of the decision rule is often used in discrete choice models. For an
a p p l i c a t i o ni nt h em a r k e tf o rd i ﬀerentiated products see Anderson, S., de Palma, A., Thisse,
J.-F., 1992. The idea has also been applied in ﬁnancial markets. See Brock and Hommes (1997)
and Lux(1998).
8This asymmetry in the treatment of the cost of information for fundamentalists and
chartists is not crucial for our results.
7chartists and fundamentalists revise their forecasting rules. With an increasing γ
agents revise their forecasts very frequently. In the limit when γ goes to inﬁnity
agents revise the forecasting rules instantaneously. When γ is low, chartists and
fundamentalists revise their forecasts relatively slowly. When γ is equal to zero
they do not revise their rules. In the latter case the fraction of chartists and
fundamentalists is constant and equal to 0.5. Thus γ i sam e a s u r eo fi n e r t i ai n
the decision to switch to the more proﬁtable rule .As will be seen this parameter
is of great importance in generating bubbles.
Chartists and fundamentalists make a proﬁt when they correctly forecast
the direction of the exchange rate movement. They make a loss if they wrongly
predict the direction of its movements. The proﬁt (the loss) they make equals
the one-period return of investing $1.
3 Solution of the model
In this section we investigate the properties of the solution of the model. We
ﬁrst study its deterministic solution. This will allow us to analyse the character-
istics of the solution that are not clouded by exogenous noise. We use simulation
techniques since the non-linearities do not allow for a simple analytical solution.
We select ” reasonable” values of the parameters, i.e. those that come close
to empirically observed values. As we will show later these are also parame-
ter values for which the model replicates the observed statistical properties of
exchange rate movements. We will also subject the analysis to an extensive
sensitivity analysis.
We ﬁrst concentrate on the ﬁxed point solutions of the model. In ﬁgure 1
we show the solutions of the exchange rate for diﬀerent initial conditions. We
plot the ﬁxed point solutions (attractors) as a function of the diﬀerent initial
conditions9. On the horizontal axis we set out the diﬀerent initial conditions.
These are initial shocks to the deterministic system. The vertical axis shows
the solutions corresponding to these diﬀerent initial conditions. The fundamen-
tal exchange rate was normalized at 0. We ﬁnd two types of ﬁxed point solutions.
First, for small disturbances in the initial conditions the ﬁxed point solutions
coincide with the fundamental exchange rate. We will call these solutions the
fundamental solutions. Second, for large disturbances in the initial conditions,
the ﬁxed point solutions diverge from the fundamental. We will call these at-
tractors, bubble attractors. It will become clear why we label these attractors in
this way. The larger is the initial shock (the noise) the farther the ﬁxed points
are removed from the fundamental exchange rate. The border between these two
types of ﬁxed points is characterised by discontinuities. This has the implication
that in the neigborhood of the border a small change in the initial condition
(the noise) can have a large eﬀect on the solution.
The diﬀerent nature of these two types of ﬁxed point attractors can also be
seen from an analysis of the chartists’ weights that correspond to these diﬀerent
9These ﬁxed point solutions of the exchange rate where obtained by running simulations
of 100,000 periods. Each time the exchange rate converged to a ﬁxed point.
8Figure 1:
ﬁxed point attractors. We show these chartists weight as a function of the initial
concitions in ﬁgure 2.
We ﬁnd, ﬁrst, that for small initial disturbances the chartists’ weight con-
verges to a number slightly above 50% of the market. Thus when the exchange
rate converges to the fundamental rate, the weight of the chartists and the
fundamentalists are approximately equal to 50%. For large initial disturbances,
however, the chartists’ weight converges to 1. Thus, when the chartists take over
as u ﬃciently large part of the market, the exchange rate converges to a bubble
attractor. The meaning of a bubble attractor can now be understood better.
It is an exchange rate equilibrium that is reached when the number of funda-
mentalists has become suﬃciently small (the number of chartists has become
suﬃciently large) so as to eliminate the mean reversion dynamics. It will be
made clearer in the next section why fundamentalists drop out of the market.
Here it suﬃces to understand that such equilibria exist. It is important to see
that these bubble attractors are ﬁxed point solutions. Once we reach them, the
exchange rate is constant. Such a constant exchange rate occurs then as a result
of two situations. One is that the chartists have taken over the whole market. In
this case, chartists who extrapolate the past movements, will forecast no change.
At the same time, since the fundamentalists have left the market, there is no
force acting to bring back the exchange rate to its fundamental value.The other
case is when the fundamentalists still have a small market share which exerts
some mean reverting pressure. This pressure is, however, oﬀset by the extrap-
olating pressure exerted by the chartists. Thus two types of equilibria exist:
a fundamental equilibrium where chartists and fundamentalists co-exist, and a
bubble equilibrium where the chartists have completely or almost completely
crowded out the fundamentalists.
9Figure 2:
These two types of equilibria diﬀer in another respect. The fundamental
equilibrium can be reached from many diﬀerent initial conditions. It is locally
stable, i.e after small disturbances the system returns to the same (fundamental)
attractor. In contrast there is one and only one initial condition that will lead
to a particular bubble equilibrium. This implies that a small disturbance leads
to a displacement of the bubble solution. Note again that the border between
these two types of equilibria is characterized by discontinuities and complexity,
i.e. small disturbances can lead to either a fundamental or a bubble equilibrium.
It is useful to compute the attractors for diﬀerent values of the fundamental
exchange rate keeping initial conditions constant. We show such an exercise in
ﬁgure 3. We now present diﬀerent fundamental values of the exchange rate on
the horizontal axis while keeping the initial condition unchanged. We have set
the initial condition for the exchange rate equal to 4. We obtain the following
results. First when the fundamental shock and the initial condition are opposite
in sign, the exchange rate converges to its fundamental value. This can be seen
by the fact that for negative values of the fundamental shocks, the attractors
are on a 45◦ line so that the equilibrium exchange rate equals its fundamental
value. In the range of fundamental shocks between 0 and 4 we obtain bubble
equilibria. This is the range in which the initial shock (noise) has the same
sign as the fundamental shock. When the positive fundamental shock becomes
large relative to the positive initial shock the system returns to a fundamental
equilibrium. Thus, bubble equilibria arise when the fundamental shock and the
noise have the same sign, and when the noise is relatively large with respect to
the fundamental shock. With suﬃciently large fundamental shocks (relative to
the noise) the equilibrium exchange rate is forced back to its fundamental value.
In appendix 1 we show some additional simulations for smaller and larger initial
10Figure 3:
conditions. These simulations conﬁrm that as the noise increases relative to the
fundamental shocks the range of bubble equilibria increases and vice versa.
The previous results allow us to understand not only why bubbles can arise.
They also shed light on why bubbles tend to crash. The noise that triggers
a bubble is temporary. Fundamental shocks, however, typically have a large
permanent component10. Thus, in a stochastic environment small fundamental
shocks accumulate to large cumulative fundamental changes. These cumulative
changes in the fundamental exchange rate at some point become overwhelming
leading to a crash. We will return to this result when we present the stochastic
simulations of the model.
4 The anatomy of bubbles and crashes
In the previous section we identiﬁed the existence of two diﬀerent types of ﬁxed
point solutions, i.e. a fundamental solution characterised by the fact that the
exchange rate converges to its fundamental value while chartists and fundamen-
talists ”co-habitate”, and a bubble solution in which the exchange rate deviates
from its fundamental value and in which chartists dominate the market. In this
section we show that in combination with stochastic shocks in the fundamental
exchange rate these features of the model lead to the emergence of bubbles and
crashes.
The way we proceed is to calibrate the model in such a way that it replicates
the statistical properties of observed exchange rate movements. We describe this
procedure in section 6. Here we present the results of simulations in the time
10In the simulations reported here a fundamental shock is permenent.
11domain using this calibrated model. We start by presenting a case study of a
typical bubble and crash scenario as produced by the stochastic version of the
m o d e l .I nt h en e x ts e c t i o nw ew i l la n a l y s em o r es y s t e m a t i c a l l yt h ef a c t o r st h a t
determine the frequency with which such bubbles and crashes occur. Figure 4
top panel shows the exchange rate and its fundamental value in the time domain;
the bottom panel shows the weight of the chartists in the same time domain.
These two pictures allow us to analyze a number of common features of a typical




First, once a bubble emerges, it sets in motion bandwagon eﬀects. As the ex-
change rate moves steadily in one direction, the use of extrapolative forecasting
rules becomes more proﬁtable, thereby attracting more chartists in the market.
This is clearly visible from a comparison of the bottom panel with the top panel
12of ﬁgure 4. We observe that the upward movement in the exchange rate coin-
c i d e sw i t ha ni n c r e a s ei nt h ew e i g h to fc h a r t i s t si nt h em a r k e t .W eh a v ec h e c k e d
this feature in many bubbles produced by the model. In appendix 2 we show
another example of a bubble, and we present the results of a causality test which
shows that the exchange rate leads the weight of chartists during a bubble and
the subsequent crash. Thus, typically a bubble starts after the exchange rate
has moved in one direction, thereby attracting extrapolating chartists which in
turn reinforces the exchange rate movement.
Second, a sustained upward (downward) movement of the exchange rate will
not develop into a full scale bubble if at some point the market does not get
suﬃciently dominated by the chartists. As can be seen ﬁgure 4 at the height
of the bubble the chartists have almost 100% of the market. Put diﬀerently,
an essential characteristic of a bubble is that at some point almost nobody is
willing to take a contrarian fundamentalist view. The market is then dominated
by agents who extrapolate the bubble into the future. This raises the question
of why fundamentalists do not take an opposite position thereby preventing the
bubble from developing. After all, the larger the deviation of the exchange rate
from the fundamental the more the fundamentalists expect to make proﬁtf r o m
selling the foreign currency. Yet they do not, and massively leave the market-
place to the chartists. The reason why they do so, is that during the bubble
phase the proﬁtability of chartism increases dramatically precisely because so
many chartists enter the market thereby pushing the exchange rate up and mak-
i n gc h a r t i s mm o r ep r o ﬁtable. There is therefore a self-fulﬁling dynamics in the
proﬁtability of chartism.
The limit of this dynamics is reached when almost everybody has become
a chartist. We arrive at our next characteristics of the bubble-crash dynam-
ics. When almost everybody is a chartist the self-reinforcing upward movement
in the exchange rate and in proﬁtability slows down, increasing the expected
relative proﬁtability of fundamentalists. This is so because while the bubble
developed, the expected proﬁts from fundamentalism also increased. However,
these were overwhelmed by the self-fulﬁlling proﬁtabilitty of chartism. When
the latter tends to slow down, fundamentalism becomes attractive again. A
small movement of the exchange rate can then trigger a fast decline in the share
of chartism, back to its normal level of a tranquil market.A crash is set in in
motion.
We have described the dynamics of bubbles in qualitative terms, although
the underlying model that produces it is quantitative in nature. However, its
complexity is such that sometimes a qualitative and fuzzy description comes
closer to understanding its nature. We also did this because our qualitative
description of the bubble and crashes is reminiscent of the classic description
of bubbles and crashes by Kindleberger in his ” Manias, Panics, and Crashes.
A History of Financial Crises”, which despite its qualitative nature has led to
a deeper understanding of the nature of bubbles and crashes than has been
possible by quantitative models. The remarkable feature of our mathematical
13model is that it produces a story that is very close to Kindleberger’s story11.
5 The frequency of bubbles
In the previous sections we showed that a very simple model is capable of gen-
erating bubbles and crashes that have the basic features of bubbles and crashes
observed in ﬁnancial markets. All we need is the existence of agents who max-
imize the utility of their portfolio, make forecasts based on the use of diﬀerent
forecasting rules and who switch to the more proﬁtable of these rules. An impor-
tant issue here concerns the frequency with which bubbles occur in our model.
We analyse this issue by simulating the stochastic version of the model and by
counting the number of periods the exchange rate is involved in a bubble. We
deﬁne a bubble here to be a deviation of the exchange rate from its fundamen-
tal value by more than three times the standard deviation of the fundamental
variable for a signiﬁcant interval of time. We have set this interval equal to 20
periods.We show the result of such an exercise in ﬁgure 5 for diﬀerent values
of the extrapolation parameter β. It shows the percentage of time the exchange
rate is involved in a bubble dynamics. We observe that when β is smaller than
1 the frequency of the occurrence of bubbles is reasonable. For values of β
larger than 1 this frequency increases exponentially. Thus the extrapolation by
chartists is an important parameter aﬀecting the frequency with which bubbles
occur.The results obtained in ﬁgure 5 are determined by the existence of bubble
Figure 5:
equilibria in the deterministic version of the model. Therefore, it is useful to
11A bubble is:”... a sharp rise in price of an asset or a range of assets in a continous process,
with the initial rise generating expectations of further rises and attracting new buyers-generally
speculators, interested in proﬁts from trading in the asset rather than its use as earning
capacity”. Kindleberger(1987).
14connect ﬁgure 5 with a ﬁgure that plots the exchange rate solutions obtained in
the deterministic version of the model. We show this in ﬁgure 6 where we set
out the equilibrium exchange rate on the vertical axis as a function of β (hor-
izontal axis). We see that for values of β < 0.85, the exchange rate converges
to its fundamental value (normalized to 0). When β > 0.85 we obtain bubble
equilibria that increasingly deviate from the fundamental value. Note that when
0.88 < β < 0.9 we have a complex structure. The equilibrium jumps back and
forth between the fundamental and a bubble. Thus, in a way ﬁgure 6 predicts
what should happen in a stochastic environment. When β < 0.85 the equilib-
rium exchange rate converges to its fundamenal value. Around this fundamental
value a basin of attraction exists which pulls the exchange rate. Only when the
noise is suﬃciently high will the exchange rate be attracted to a bubble equilib-
rium (see ﬁgure 1 where we showed that with β =0 .8 as u ﬃciently high initial
shock will pull the exchange rate towards a bubble equilibium). Thus, when
β < 0.85 bubbles will be relatively infrequent events. When β increases above
0.85, however, bubble equilibria appear, increasing the probability of bubbles in
a stochastic environment. Note however that even when β is larger enough (e.g.
0.9) to produce only bubble equilibria in the deterministic version of the model,
the probability of a bubble is not 1 in the stochastic version. The reason is that
the noise can lead the exchange rate within the basin of attraction around the
fundamental or, more importantly, that the shocks in the fundamentals displace
the basin of attraction leading to a crash in the bubble.
Figure 6:
From the analysis of the diﬀerent types of equilibria made in section 3,
we predicted that bubbles are more likely to occur when the size of the noise
is large relative to the size of the shocks in the fundamental. We now test
this prediction in the stochastic environment. We proceed as follows. We ﬁrst
15simulate the model assuming that the variance of the noise is 50% higher than
the variance of the shocks in the fundamentals. We then perform a simulation
with the reverse assumption, i.e. the variance of the shocks in the fundamentals
is 50% higher than the variance of the noise. We show the results in ﬁgure 7. We
ﬁnd that the percentage of time in which bubbles occur is about twice as high
when the variance of the noise is high relative to the variance of the shocks in
the fundamental (left panel). This result is interesting for the following reason.
It is often said that if the authorities reduce the variability of the fundamental
variables (inﬂation, money growth, etc.) the exchange rate will also become
less volatile. Our results indicate that this may not be so. If the noise is high
relative to volatility of fundamentals, bubbles may even become more frequent12.
The frequency of the occurrence of bubbles also depends on the parameter γ
 
Figure 7:
which measures the rate with which chartists and fundamentalists revise their
forecasting rules. We have called this parameter rate of revision.I naw a y ,γ also
measures the speed with which agents learn about the proﬁtability of the other
rule and revise their forecasts. The lower is this parameter the less frequently
agents will revise their forecasting rules. In the limit when γ =0the agents
never revise their forecasts which could be interpreted as a world which agents
perceive to be stationary.
In order to illustrate the importance of this parameter, we ﬁrst show the
results of the deterministic simulations in ﬁgures 8. We observe that for values
of γ lower than (approximately) 1.2 the exchange rate converges to its funda-
mental value. For higher values we obtain bubble equilibria13. Note also a zone
of complexity where the location of the bubble equilibria is very sensitive to
small changes in the parameter γ. In ﬁgure 9 we show the results of the sto-
chastic simulation under the same parameter conﬁguration. We observe that
12It is also worth pointing out that despite the dramatic decline of the variability of im-
portant fundamental variables like inﬂation during the last twenty years, there is no evidence
that the exchange rates of the major currencies have become less volatile.
13In appendix 3 we show a similar ﬁg u r ew h e r ew eh a v es e tβ =0 .9. In that case the critical
value of γ which produces bubble equilibria is lowered.
16for low values of γ the occurence of bubbles is very infrequent. As γ increases
the frequency of bubbles increases signiﬁcantly.
The previous results allow us to shed some additional light on the nature
of bubbles and crashes. As we have seen before, bubbles arise because agents
are attracted by the proﬁtability of the extrapolating (chartist) rule, and this
attraction in turn makes this forecasting rule more proﬁtable, leading to a self-
fulﬁlling increase in proﬁtability. For this dynamics to work, agents’ decision to
switch must be suﬃciently sensitive to the relative proﬁtabilities of the rules. If
it is not, no bubble equilibria can arise, as is the case when γ does not exceed
1. The larger is γ the more likely it is that these self-fulﬁlling bubble equilibria
arise. The interesting aspect of this result is that in a world where agents quickly
react to changing proﬁt opportunities, bubbles become more likely than in a
world where agents do not react quickly to these new proﬁt opportunities. One
way to interpret this result could be the following. When γ is low, agents do not
quickly adjust their forecasting rules to changing relative proﬁtabilities. This
must be a world that they perceive to be stationary in which there is no need
to switch in and out of diﬀerent forecasting rules. In such a world, bubbles are
unlikely to occur. Conversely, in a world where agents react to every whimp in
relative proﬁtabilities bubbles will be a frequent occurrence.
The policy implication of this result is that by increasing the inertia in the
system so that agents react less quickly to changes in relative proﬁtabilities of
forecasting rules, the authorities could reduce the probability of the occurrence
of bubbles. How this can be done and whether some form of taxation of exchange
transactions can do this, is a question we want to analyse in future research.
Figure 8:
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6 Fundamentalism and risk
In the previous sections we showed how bubbles and crashes occur in a world
where agents use diﬀerent forecasting rules. The essence of the dynamics is
that at some point extrapolative forecasting (chartism) becomes more prof-
itable than mean-reversion forecasting (fundamentalism). This attracts more
chartists enhancing the proﬁtability of extrapolative forecasting. At the same
time fundamentalism becomes loss making driving agents away from this kind
of forecasting.
An implicit assumption in the model is that as the exchange rate moves away
from its fundamental during the bubble, fundamentalists’ perception of the risk
in taking a ”contrarian” i.e. fundamentalist position remains unaﬀected by the
increasing ”misalignment” of the exchange rate. This assumption is crucial
because it explains why in the bubble phase fundamentalists massively decide
to become chartists.
In this section we assume that fundamentalists’ perception of the risk in
taking a fundamentalist position during the bubble changes and increases with
the misalignment. Put diﬀerently, we will now assume that as the misalingment
increases during the bubble, fundamentalists become increasingly conﬁdent that
their contrarian forecast is correct. Thus, while their fundamentalist forecast is
loss-making during the bubble, the fundamentalists ﬁnd it increasingly less risky
to make such a forecast as we move along the bubble path.
We use the same model as in the previous sections except that we amend
the equations describing the switches from fundamentalist to chartist forecasting





















f,t−1 are the risk adjusted net proﬁts made by chartists’




f,t−1 = πf,t−1 − C − µσ2
f,t−1.
We now redeﬁne the risk component to take into account that the risk per-
ception of the fundamentalists declines as the misalignment increases. We do





1+φ | st−1 − s∗
t−1 |
(15)
where φ ≥ 0 is a parameter measuring the sensitivity of the fundamental-
ists’ risk aversion to the degree of misalignment (| st−1 − s∗
t−1 |) When φ =0
fundamentalists are not sensitive to the misalignment. With an increasing φ,
the fundamentalists’ risk aversion declines, making them more willing to take a
contrarian position during a bubble.
We redeﬁne the risk adjusted proﬁts of the fundamentalists as follows
π0
f,t−1 = πf,t−1 − C − µ0
tσ2
f,t−1 (16)
We now proceed in the same way as before. We ﬁrst solve the deterministic
part of the model We then add the stochastics to the model. We will analyze in
particular how sensitive the results are to the coeﬃcient φ, which measures how
sensitive is the fundamentalists’ risk aversion to the degree of misalignment.
We start by presenting the solution of the exchange rate for diﬀerent values
of φ. We have selected an initial value that in the absence of such sensitivity
(φ =0 ) produces a bubble equilibrium14. The results are shown in ﬁgure 10.
We observe that when φ =0 , a bubble equilibrium exists. However, a relatively
small positive value of φ (in this case φ =0 .01) is suﬃcient to eliminate the
bubble equilibrium. The exact value of φ that achieves this depends on the
other parameters of the model and on the initial conditions. For example, with
high values of γ (the parameter which measures the sensitivity of agents to the
proﬁtability of the forecasting rules), we need a higher φ to eliminate bubble
equilibria. We show an example in ﬁgure 11. In this ﬁgure we set the ﬁxed point
solutions as a function of the shocks in the fundamental. We have set φ =0 .5
and we assume a high sensitivity to proﬁts (γ = 10) We ﬁnd that in this case
certain shocks can still lead to a bubble equilibrium. For a suﬃciently high value
of φ however these bubble equilibria disappear. Thus, for example, when φ =0 .9
the bubble equilibria disappear for all shocks. See ﬁgure 12. The next step in
the analysis is to add the stochastics to the model. As will be remembered, this
stochastics comes from the fact that the fundamental exchange rate is driven by
14It will be remembered that the occurrence of a bubble equilibrium depends on the initial




a random walk process and that the forecasts are inﬂuenced by noise. Adding
stochastics to the model makes it possible for the attractors to be displaced and
to jump from fundamental to bubble equilibria, as described in the previous
sections.
We computed the frequency with which bubbles occur in a stochastic envi-
ronment for diﬀerent values of the sensitivity of the fundamentalists’ risk aver-
sion to misalignment (φ). We show the results in ﬁgure 13. Each simulation is
run during 1000 periods (T=1000). We ﬁnd that when φ is close to zero the
frequency with which bubbles occur is relatively high, certainly much higher
than observed in reality. Small increased in φ, however, lead to a signiﬁcant
decline in the frequency of bubbles. For values of φ > 0.5 this frequency tends
to stabilize around 0.5%.
One can conclude that, not surprisingly, the occurrence of bubbles depends
in a signiﬁcant way on how the fundamentalists perceive the risk of taking a
contrarian position when a bubble develops. When the fundamentalists’ risk
aversion is independent of the degree of misalignment bubbles will occur fre-
quently. When, however, fundamentalists becomes less risk avert as the bubble
develops, these bubbles will be less frequent.
7 Empirical relevance of the model
In this section we analyse how well our model mimics the empirical anomalies
and puzzles that have been uncovered by the ﬂourishing empirical literature. We
calibrate the model such that it replicates the observed statistical properties of
exchange rate movements. In order to do so we selected a parameter conﬁg-
uration that mimics these properties most closely. We discuss these diﬀerent
21Figure 13:
statistical properties in the following sections.
7.1 Fat tails and excess kurtosis
It is well known that the exchange rate changes do not follow a normal dis-
tribution. Instead it has been observed that the distribution of exchange rate
changes has more density around the mean than the normal and exhibits fatter
tails than the normal (see de Vries(2001)). This phenomenon was ﬁrst discov-
ered by Mandelbrot (1963), in commodity markets. Since then, fat tails and
excess kurtosis have been discovered in many other asset markets including the
exchange market. In particular, in the latter the returns have a kurtosis typ-
ically exceeding 315 and a measure of fat tails (Hill index) ranging between 2
and 5 (see Koedijk, Stork and de Vries (1992), Huisman, et al.(2002)). It im-
plies that most of the time the exchange rate movements are relatively small
but that occasionally periods of turbulence occur with relatively large exchange
rate changes.
In table 1 we show the kurtosis and the Hill.index of the USD-DEM and
the JPY-DEM exchange rate returns for the period 1975-1998 . We computed
the Hill index for diﬀerent cut-oﬀ points of the tails (2.5%, 5%, 10%) and for
4d i ﬀerent subsamples of the original series. We ﬁnd that these exchange rates
exhibited excess kurtosis and fat tails during the sample period.
Another empirical ﬁnding that has bee observed is that the kurtosis is re-
duced under time aggregation ( see Lux(1998), Calvet and Fisher(2002)). We
checked this ﬁnding for the same exchange rates. In table 2 we show the results
for USD-DEM and JPY-DEM exchange rates, and we conﬁrm that the kurtosis
15The normal distibution has a kurtosis index equal to 3.
22Table 1: Kurtosis and Hill index USD-DEM and JPY-DEM 1975-98
kurtosis median Hill index
Exchange rate 2.5% tail 5% tail 10% tail
USD-DEM 12.1 4.0 3.6 3.1
JPY-DEM 19.6 3.7 3.6 2.9
Table 2: Kurtosis and time aggregation USD-DEM and JPY-DEM 1975-98
5p e r i o d 10 period 50 period
Parameter values returns returns returns
USD-DEM 7.4 5.3 3.4
JPY-DEM 14.9 5.7 2.7
declines under time aggregation.
The next step in the analysis was to check whether these empirical features
are also shared by the simulated exchange rate changes in our model.
The model was simulated using normally distributed random disturbances
(with mean = 0 and standard deviation = 1). We computed the kurtosis and
the Hill index of the simulated exchange rate returns. We computed the Hill
index for 4 diﬀerent samples of 2000 observations. In addition, as before, we
considered three diﬀerent cut-oﬀ points of the tails (2.5%, 5%, 10%). We show
the results of the kurtosis and of the Hill index in table 3. We ﬁnd that for
a broad range of parameter values the kurtosis exceeds 3 and the Hill index
indicates the presence of fat tails.
In ﬁgure 14 we show the probability density of the USD-DEM exchange
rate and of our simulated exchange rates, up-left and down-left panel respec-
tively. On the right panel we plot the probability density of normally distrib-
uted returns. We observe that the empirical distribution diﬀers from the normal
distribution and that it strikingly resembles the distribution of our simulated
exchange rate returns. In appendix 3 we present the results for the JPY-DEM
exchange rate returns.
Finally we check if the kurtosis of our simulated exchange rate returns
declines under time aggregation. In order to do so, we chose diﬀerent time
aggregation periods and we computed the kurtosis of the time-aggregated ex-
change rate returns. We found that the kurtosis declines under time aggregation.
In table 4 we show the results for some sets of parameter values16.
The previous results suggest that the speculative dynamics of the model
transforms normally distributed noise in the exchange rate into exchange rate
movements with tails that are signiﬁcantly fatter than the normal distribution
and with more density around the mean. Thus, our model mimics an important
empirical regularity, i.e. that exchange rate movements are characterised by
tranquil periods (occurring most of the time) and turbulent periods (occurring
16Another empirical regularity of the distribution of exchange returns is its symmetry. We
computed the skewness, and we could not reject that the distribution is symmetric.




infrequently).This phenomenon has been also called intermittency phenomenon
(see Lux(1998)).
7.2 The ” excess volatility” puzzle
In this section we analyse another important empirical regularity, which has
been called the ”excess volatility” puzzle, i.e. the volatility of the exchange rate
by far exceeds the volatility of the underlying economic variables. Baxter and
Stockman (1989) and Flood and Rose (1995) found that while the movements
from ﬁxed to ﬂexible exchange rates led to a dramatic increase in the volatility
of the exchange rate no such increase could be detected in the volatility of
the underlying economic variables. This contradicted the ’news’ models that
predicted that the volatility of the exchange rate can only increase when the
variability of the underlying fundamental variables increases ( see Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ (1996) for a recent formulation of this model)17.
17In addition, Goodhart (1989) and Goodhart and Figlioli (1991) found that most of the
changes in the exchange rates occur when there is no observable news in the fundamental
economic variables. This ﬁnding contradicted the theoretical models (based on the eﬃcient
market hypothesis), which imply that the exchange rate can only move when there is news in
24Table 3: Kurtosis and Hill index
kurtosis median Hill index
Parameter values 2.5% tail 5% tail 10% tail
β=0.9, γ=0.001 6.9 6.1 5.4 4.4
β=0.9, γ=0.5 11.0 7.4 5.7 4.3
β=0.9, γ=1 48.1 7.1 5.5 4.3
β=0.9, γ=5 25.0 7.1 5.9 4.2
β=0.8, γ=0.001 6.9 6.6 5.2 4.4
β=0.8, γ=0.5 3.8 5.9 5.7 4.3
β=0.8, γ=1 9.3 7.3 5.7 4.6
β=0.8, γ=5 21.4 7.4 5.9 4.6
Table 4: Kurtosis and time aggregation
5p e r i o d 10 period 25 period 50 period
Parameter values returns returns returns returns
β=0.9, γ=0.001 177.7 30.9 2.9 3.2
β=0.9, γ=0.5 39.2 17.0 3.7 2.7
β=0.9, γ=1 43.3 33.4 6.7 2.9
β=0.9, γ=5 46.1 40.4 9.6 2.9
β=0.8, γ=0.001 185.7 14.3 8.5 2.5
β=0.8, γ=0.5 175.6 4.5 9.39 12.2
β=0.8, γ=1 74.1 16.2 3.0 2.2
β=0.8, γ=5 90.5 30.4 3.3 2.9
25In order to deal with this puzzle we compute the noise to signal ratio in the
simulated exchange rate. We derive this noise to signal ratio as follows:
var(s)=var(f)+var(n) (17)
where var(s) is the variance of the simulated exchange rate, var(f) is the
variance of the fundamental and var(n) is the residual variance (noise) pro-
duced by the non-linear speculative dynamics which is uncorrelated with var(f).







The ratio var(n)/var(f) can be interpreted as the noise to signal ratio. It
gives a measure of how large the noise produced by the speculative dynamics
is with respect to the exogenous volatility of the fundamental exchange rate.
We simulate this noise to signal ratio for diﬀerent values of the extrapolation
parameter beta (see ﬁgure 15). In addition, since this ratio is sensitive to the
time interval over which it is computed we checked how it changes depending on
the length of the time interval. In particular, we expect that the noise-to-signal
ratio is larger when it is computed on a short than on a long time horizon. We
show the results in ﬁgure 16 which assumes the same parameter conﬁguration
as ??.
Figure 15:
First, we ﬁnd that with increasing β the noise to signal ratio increases. This
implies that when the chartists increase the degree with which they extrapo-
late the past exchange rate movements, the noise in the exchange rate, which
the fundamentals.
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is unrelated to fundamentals, increases. Thus, the signal about the fundamen-
tals that we can extract from the exchange rate becomes more clouded when
the chartists extrapolate more. Second, we ﬁnd that when the time horizon
increases the noise-to-signal ratio declines. This is so because over long time
horizons most of the volatility of the exchange rate is due to the fundamentals’
volatility and very little to the endogenous noise. In contrast, over short time
horizons the endogenous volatility is predominant and the signal that comes
from the fundamentals is weak. This is consistent with the empirical ﬁnd-
ings following Meese and Rogoﬀ(1983) celebrated studies. This literature tells
us that when the forecasting horizon increases the performance of forecasting
based on fundamentals tends to improve relative to random walk forecasting
(see Mark(1995), Faust, et al. (2002)). .
8 Accuracy and Proﬁtability of Forecasting Rules
In the previous sections we discussed the statistical properties of our simulated
exchange rates. The parameter γ,i.e. the rate of revision of the forecasts made
by the agents, turned to be of crucial importance. We now analyse in more
details how the choice of γ aﬀects the precision with which agents make forecasts
. In order to do so, we compute two measures of accuracy of the forecasting







t−k (st−k+1) − st−k+1
¤2
(19)
It should be noted that this accuracy measure is identical to the variance in the
forecasting rules ( see equation 10) .
27Table 5: Accuracy of forecasting rules
Accuracy Extreme Accuracy
γ fundamentalists chartists fundamentalists chartists
0.01 0.11 0.09 0 0
0.1 0.11 0.09 0 0
1 2.21 0.08 0.95 0
5 14.07 0.08 2.88 0
10 15.0 0.08 3.57 0
Our second measure captures the extreme values of the forecast errors, i.e.
those that exceed a particular treshhold. It measures the capacity of a rule to
avoid extreme inaccuracies (and thus extreme losses). We will call it extreme
accuracy and we deﬁne it as follows: .
Fi,t =
½
D − Ai,t , if D>A i,t
0 ,i f D ≤ Ai,t
(20)
where D is a threshold.
In table 5 we represent the two measures of accuracy of the forecasting rules.
These were computed as the average of Ai,t and Fi,t respectively obtained from
running 100 simulations of 10000 periods.We set β =0 .9. For diﬀerent values of
β results are qualitatively the same.
It can be seen that both measures of accuracy of the fundamentalists’ fore-
casting rule decrease with increasing γ. Conversely, both measures of accuracy
of the chartists rule are unaﬀected by increasing γ. This implies that under high
γ regime , i.e. when agents revise their forecasting rules very frequently the ac-
curacy of the fundamentalists forecasting rules deteriorates signiﬁcantly. This
result is related to the increasing disconnection of the volatility of the exchange
rate from the fundamenal variability and the increasing frequency of bubbles
and crashes when γ increases.
An interesting issue is how the proftis of these diﬀerent types of agents
evolve with increasing γ. I nt a b l e6w er e p r e s e n tt h ep r o ﬁts of chartists and
fundamentalists for diﬀerent values of γ18. These are obtained in the same way
as in table 5, i.e. as averages computed from 100 simulation runs of 10000
periods. As before β =0 .9.T h er e s u l t sa r en o ta ﬀected by changing β.
The remarkable result is that as γ increases the proﬁts made by chartists
increase signiﬁcantly while the proﬁts of the fundamentalists decline. The gains
of the chartists outweight the losses of the fundamentalists, and this is increas-
ingly the case as γ increases. Thus in an environment characterised by frequent
occurrencies of bubbles and crashes total market proﬁts are high. Put diﬀerently,
in an environment in which agents frequently revise their forecasting rules bub-
bles and crashes will occur frequently. In such a noisy environment, chartists
make large proﬁts and fundamentalists make large losses. The result of all this
18Note that the fundamentalists’ proﬁts are net of the ﬁxed costs of collecting information
C, which was set equal to 0.05 in the simulations reported here.
28Table 6: Proﬁt as a function of gamma
γ chartists proﬁts fund. proﬁts total proﬁts
0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.00
0.1 0.04 -0.03 0.01
1 0.07 -0.04 0.03
5 0.12 -0.06 0.06
10 0.12 -0.06 0.06
is that as γ increases, the the chartists increasingly dominate the market. For
suﬃciently high values of γ the chartists’ weight converges to 1 and the funda-
mentalists tend to disappear from the market. We show this feature in ﬁgure 17
w h e r ew ep l o tt h ew e i g h to ft h ec h a r t i s ts as a function of the rate of revision γ.
Thus in an environment in which agents quickly revise their forecasting rules,
chartists will thrive and will dominate the market. In such an environment it is
quite rational to be a chartist. Next, we analyse how frequently technical traders
Figure 17:
anf fundamentalists make large proﬁts and losses that exceed a particular tresh-
hold. In order to do so, we proceed as follows. First, we compute proﬁts and
losses. Second, we consider only proﬁts and losses that are larger than a certain
threshold that we set equal to 1.5 . Third, we compute how many times large
proﬁts and losses occur. The results are summarised in table7 for β =0 .9.
For low values of γ both chartists and fundamentalists never face large losses
and never make large proﬁts. However, for increasing values of γ agents diﬀer
greatly in their ability to make exceptionally large proﬁts and losses. For values
of γ >1 , fundamentalists make large losses more frequently than chartists. For
29Table 7: Percentage of periods of large proﬁts and large losses as a function of
gamma (in percent)
γ Proﬁts > 1.5 Losses < -1.5
chartists fundamentalists chartists fundamentalists
0.001 0.001 0 0 0
0.01 0 0 0 0
0.1 0.03 0 0 0
1 0.01 0.01 0 0
1.5 0.13 0 0 0.14
5 0.13 0 0 0.14
10 0.14 0 0 0.15
example, for γ =1 0they make large losses, approximately, 0.15% of the time.
Conversely chartists never face such large losses for any value of γ.I n s t e a d
when γ is large, chartists make exceptionally large proﬁts more frequently than
fundamentalists. This asymmetry is related to the occurrence of bubbles. As we
have seen, when γ is high, bubbles occur more frequently. This is when chartists
can make exceptionally large proﬁts, while fundamentalists then make very large
losses. When the bubble crashes, chartists make losses, however, these remain
limited as the chartists quickly ride on the downward trend in the market. The
interesting feature of this result is that, in contrast to fundamentalist rules,
chartism is a forecasting rule that has an built-in insurance against large losses.
This is also one of the reasons why it tends to dominate in the market.
9C o n c l u s i o n
Bubbles and crashes in ﬁnancial markets in general, and in the foreign exchange
markets in particular, have occurred frequently, often with devastating eﬀects.
In this paper we provide a framework for analysing the emergence and the
subsequent disappearance of bubbles in the foreign exchange market. We use
a very simple model in which agents use an optimal portfolio in the mean-
variance utility framework. The special feature of our model is that individual
agents recognize that they are not capable of understanding and processing the
complex information structure of the underlying model. As a result, they use
simple rules to forecast the exchange rates. None of these rules is rational in the
technical sense. Yet we claim that these agents act rationally within the context
of the uncertainty they face. That is, agents check the ’ﬁtness’ (proﬁtability) of
the forecasting rule at each point in time and decide to reject the rule if it is less
proﬁtable (in a risk adjusted sense) than competing rules. Our model is in the
tradition of evolutionary dynamics where agents use trial and error strategies.
We assume that some of the forecasting rules are based on extrapolating past
exchange rate movements (chartism) and others are based on mean reversion
towards the fundamental rate.
30The model generates two types of equilibria. The ﬁrst one, which we called
a fundamental equilibrium, is one in which the exchange rate converges to its
fundamental value. The exchange rate, however, can also converge to a second
type of equilibrium, which we called a bubble equilibrium, and which is reached
in a self-fulﬁlling manner. An important feature of the bubble equilibrium is
that chartism (extrapolative forecasting) takes over most of the market. We
simulated the model in a stochastic environment and generated complex sce-
narios of bubbles and crashes. One interesting aspect of the model is that it
explains both the emergence of the bubble and its subsequent crash.
We also analysed under what conditions bubbles and crashes occur. We ﬁnd
that when agents react quickly to changing relative proﬁtabilities of the diﬀerent
forecasting rules, the frequency of bubbles increases. We also ﬁnd that in this
c a s et h ee x c h a n g er a t ed y n a m i c si sv e r y complex and produces features such
as fat tails, excess kurtosis and excess volatility; features that are also found
in reality. In such an environment chartists will make large proﬁts and will
tend to dominate the market, crowding out fundamentalists which have a poor
forecasting record and make losses. It will then be quite rational to be a chartist.
We also found an asymmetry in the proﬁts and losses of chartists and funda-
mentalists When agents revise their rules frequently then fundamentalists make
large losses more frequently than chartists, while chartists make large proﬁts
more frequently than fundamentalists. This asymmetry is related to the occur-
rence of bubbles, which are sources of large proﬁts for chartists using extrap-
olating forecasting rules and large losses for fundamentalists. The interesting
feature of this result is that, in contrast to fundamentalist rules, chartism is a
forecasting rule that has an built-in insurance against large losses. This is also
one of the reasons why it tends to dominate in the market.
We found that bubbles are more likely to emerge when the variance of the
noise is high relative to the variance of the fundamental variable. Thus, policies
that lead to less variability of the underlying fundamentals (e.g. inﬂation) do
not necessarily reduce the probability of bubbles.
We also concluded that the frequency with which bubbles occur depends in a
signiﬁcant way on how the fundamentalists perceive the risk of taking a contrar-
ian position when a bubble develops. When the fundamentalists’ risk aversion is
independent of the degree of misalignment bubbles will occur frequently. When,
however, fundamentlists becomes less risk avert as the bubble develops, these
bubbles will be less frequent.
Finally we tested our model in the sense that we reproduced the statistical
properties of exchange rate changes observed in reality, i.e. excess volatility,
excess kurtosis, fat tails. Invariably we ﬁnd that the parameter values that best
mimick these properties are also those that produce signiﬁcant probabilities of
bubbles and crashes.
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34A Fixed attractors and fundamental shocks: ad-
ditional results
In this appendix we present additional simulations of the eﬀect of shocks in the
fundamental on the exchange rate. We assume diﬀerent values of the initial con-
ditions. The results are shown in ﬁgures 18, 19and 20. When the initial condition
(noise) is small (ﬁgure A1) no bubble equilibria exist and the exchange rate
always coincides with its fundamental value. When the initial condition is grad-





36B Causality tests between exchange rate and
chartist weight
In this appendix we present the results of causality tests between the exchange
rate and the weight of chartists during a bubble and crash episode. We simulated
the model using the standard set of parameters, and we selected an episode
during which a bubble and crash occurred. We show such an episode in ﬁgure
A2. A visual inspection of the graph reveals that the exchange rate appears
to lead the chartist weight. at least when the bubble starts and later when the
bubble bursts. Note also that the crash occurs faster than the bubble phase, a
f e a t u r ew eo f t e nﬁnd in our simulated bubbles and crashes. This has also been













exchange rate chartist weight
Exchange rate and chartist weight during bubble
Next we performed a Granger causality test on the exchange rate and the
chartist weight during the bubble and crash episode represented in ﬁgure A219.
The result of this causality test is presented in table A1. We observe that we
cannot reject the hypothesis that the exchange rate leads the chartists’ weight
during the bubble and crash episode, while we can reject the reverse. We ﬁnd
this feature in most bubble and crash episodes.
19We checked for stationarity and could not reject that the two series are stationary during
the sample period.
37Table 8: Granger causality tests
Null Hypothesis: F-statistic Probability
cw not Granger cause exchange rate 0.377 0.865
exchange rate not Granger cause cw 6.85 6.4E-06
Note: obs=211, lags=5.
38C Stylised Facts of JPY-DEM Exchange Rate
The up left panel shows the distribution of the JPY-DEM returns. The bottom
left panel represents the distribution of our simulated returns. The right panels
show the distribution of normally distributed exchange rate returns.
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